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Dr Tom Webb reflects on the recent independent review of the Mental Health Act 1983 and argues 
that the proposals relating to the Hospital Managers' s.23 discharge power are problematic.  
On 6th December 2018 the Independent Review of the Mental Health Act 1983 published its Final 
Report. While all involved in drafting this wide-ranging and thought-provoking document 
undoubtedly had good intentions, the proposals relating to the Hospital Managers’ s.23 discharge 
power (s.23 MHA 1983) are problematic. 
The Review has, unfortunately, repeated past mistakes in making a number of proposals regarding 
s.23 founded on uninformed or, at least under-evidenced, assumptions. The Review proposes the 
removal of the discharge power, compensated for only by the limited transfer in spirit – not 
substance – of some s.23-based review responsibilities to an already overpressed Mental Health 
Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’). The consequences of these proposals cannot have been understood by the 
Review since the Report confesses: 
‘We do not know how many hearings take place a year or what the discharge rate is, as there is no 
nationally collected data.’ 
That the Review would, without any sense of the size and shape of the processes concerned 
recommend a legislative leap in the dark may seem strange. However, it is in keeping with how s.23 
reform has historically been approached (see Webb 2018; and here). 
The current context 
The Hospital Managers’ s.23 discharge power is significant, but ‘invisible’ (Bartlett & Sandland 2014). 
It enables discharge from compulsory care against medical advice. 
A variety of specific processes take place under s.23 (Code of Practice, chapter 38): 
1. Patient-initiated challenge to the legality of the section authorising compulsory care. 
2. Review of renewal decisions (ss.20, 20A). 
3. Review of s.25 barring orders preventing Nearest Relative discharge (a routine AHM 
function the Review appears to have overlooked (p.84)). 
4. AHM-initiated reviews. 
When referring to the “Hospital Managers” in this context, reference is generally being made only to 
Associate Hospital Managers (AHMs). AHMs are appointed (not employed) by individual organisations 
(e.g. an NHS trust, ‘the Manager’), which delegates the s.23 power to AHMs. This arrangement 
allows the organisation to have its employees’ decisions independently reviewed where they might 
otherwise only be subject to internal, administrative-managerial oversight. 
The Report says that AHMs are ‘local, lay people’ (p.145). Section 23 is locally administered, and the 
Review is correct that ‘there is no national job description or framework’ for AHMs. However, 
there is little evidence about the professional or lived experience of those sitting as AHMs, so to 
conclude that they are ‘lay’ is not possible. 
Lastly, the Review may be correct that ‘the patient does not usually have a lawyer to represent 
them’, or that they may only have ‘a trainee solicitor … using [the hearing] as “practice for the real 
thing” [implicitly, the Tribunal]’ (p.145). However, there is no national evidence to support these 
claims. If the Report is correct, a lack of representation at the hearings is likely due to the legal aid 
rules, which privilege Tribunal hearings and discourage representation elsewhere (legal aid rules, 
9.71-9.75). 
The proposals 
The Review makes four proposals in relation to AHMs: 
1. Remove their power of discharge (p.145). 
2. Discontinue AHM-led renewal review, and convert this to administrative-managerial review, 
perhaps supplemented by a second clinical opinion (p.146). 
3. Compensate for the above loss of review via very limited reallocation of oversight to the 
Tribunal, though not by any substantive transfer of responsibilities (pp. 25, 146). 
4. Convert the AHMs from an empowered reviewing body to Hospital Visitors who would 
‘[visit] wards and [make] reports’ only (p.146). 
The removal of the discharge power is risky given the absence of national statistics that would 
indicate the effect of these. At present, the scale of the process has to be inferred from the 
government’s guess in 2004 that there may have been 10,000 hearings in the preceding year (Joint 
Committee Report, paras 301, 307). 
The evidence on discharge rates is almost equally poor, with limited statistical information suggesting 
a rate of 2-8.4% (see Webb 2018). Yet, when considered alongside figures from a small study 
indicating that in 27% of cases merely asking for a hearing prompted a discharge by the Responsible 
Clinician (RC) (MHAC Report, 2005-2007), the effect of the s.23 power looks altogether more 
significant. Thus, the suggestion that ‘managers are likely to agree with the [RC]’ (p.145) is not 
necessarily problematic, given that the RC should have already discharged strong cases, leaving only 
either-way, and weaker applications to AHMs. 
In the light of these figures, the second and third proposals take on a different character. When, if 
the process becomes purely managerial-administrative instead of quasi-judicial, will the patients 
discharged by AHMs be discharged? When will the patients discharged after asking for a hearing, be 
discharged? Where will the 10,000+ hearings currently heard by AHMs go? There is no suggestion 
that they should be heard by the Tribunal (p.146). The proposals appear to run counter to the aim 
of ‘reducing compulsion’ in the Report’s title. 
The last proposal argues for the removal of the AHMs’ teeth, their power of discharge, and their 
conversion to a mere report-generating process. Under the proposals, the AHMs will be encouraged 
to raise concerns about inadequate care and inappropriate treatment but will lack powers to enforce 
their conclusions. Toothless processes are rarely a force for change. They might, ironically, even 
become a weak duplication of the Care Quality Commission or Non-Executive Directors.  
On its face, the Review proposes a reduction in the available safeguards for patients, and for 
healthcare organisations to have their decisions independently examined. Furthermore, any 
economic savings in staff time may be wiped out by patients staying in hospital longer, or filing costly 
legal challenges (e.g. judicial reviews) against administrative-managerial decisions not overseen by the 
Tribunal (i.e. renewals). Far from ‘[duplicating] the role of the Tribunal’ and ‘not [representing] an 
effective use of scare resources’ (p.145), the AHMs may save effort and cost. 
Correcting the Evidence Deficit 
The Review’s proposals can be critiqued because they do not have firm evidential foundations. I am 
currently undertaking research, funded by Lancaster University, which aims to fill the evidential gap 
identified above, and provide a national picture of the various local practices and policies relating to 
s.23. Consequently, I hope that it will soon be possible to have a more informed discussion about 
the future of AHMs as part of the conversation started by the Review.  
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